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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ANTI TRUST LAW: THE IMPACT OF THE CELLOPHANE CASE
ON THE CONCEPT OF MARKET
Although the word "market" is not expressly stated in the Sherman
Act, it plays a decisive role in the determination of the existence of
monopoly power.' In general terms, monopoly power is the ability to
control price or exclude competition in a certain area of business.2 The
determination of this area of business raises important questions of law
and economics. Recently, the Supreme Court in the Cellophane case3 af-
firmed a district court opinion vindicating DuPont of "monopolizing"
cellophane in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.4 The decision,
rendered over a strong dissent, dealt mainly with the determination of
the relevant "market" in which cellophane was to be included. Prior to
the Cellophane case the concept of "market" had witnessed a long and
tedious development, because of the complex economic factors which
market definition entails.5  The issue in the Cellophane case dealt pri-
marily with the determination of market in the product sense, in that it
explored the effect of substitute wrapping materials on cellophane sales.
The majority of the Court held that cellophane was not a market in itself
but part of the greater "flexible wrapping paper" market, and since it
comprised only twenty percent of this latter market it could not possibly
"monopolize" it. The dissenting three judges, on the other hand, thought
that cellophane was its own market and further urged that DuPont was
guilty of monopolizing the "cellophane market." The difference of
opinion of the divided Court and the effect of this decision on anti-trust
1. ATT. GEN. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
at 44 (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT). "Monopoly power cannot exist in a vacu-
um, nor in theory alone. Testing for monopoly power requires first delineating that
market within which power must be gauged." Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the udiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 283 (1955).
2. REPORT at 43.
3. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 251 U.S. 377 (1956), affirming
118 F.Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
5. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the theory of market in
anti-trust cases see Note, 54 COLUSI. L. REV. 580 (1954) and Note, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 69
(1954). Also see Turner, Anti-Trust Policy and the Cellophane Case 70 HA.Rv. L. REv.
281 (1956) for a lengthy discussion of this development in conjunction with an analysis
of the Supreme Court decision in the Cellophane case.
For a further discussion on the field of economic data as used in judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings and the difficulties therein, see CURRENT BUSINESS STUDIES,
March 1954 and October 1954.
NOTES
law pose critical problems.6
An initial observation on the trial court litigation leads to the con-
clusion that the government attempted to base its arguments on theoreti-
cal assumptions concerning the competitiveness of the market.7 Con-
versely, DuPont in its defense came forth with detailed evidence to de-
velop a picture of intense competition in the flexible wrapping paper in-
dustry. DuPont presented testimony of competitors and consumers from
both large and small industries. It supplemented its contentions by evi-
dence from market surveys, reliable trade journals, authoritative texts,
reports of DuPont's own officers and salesmen, and physical samples of
the various materials.' The trial court judge even went to a packaging
show in Atlantic City to view the relative competitiveness of the ma-
terials.9 After the lengthy proceedings the trial court made specific find-
ings and conclusions of facts very favorable to DuPont."° The trial
court judge stated his belief in the great sensitivity among the customers
of the flexible wrapping paper industry, both as to price and quality
changes. 1 He further found that because of these price and quality
changes the consumers of cellophane had shifted their habits of buying
and that cellophane had experienced both substantial gains and losses in
sales in relation to the other materials caused by these economic judg-
ments." These fluctuations of business the trial court characterized as
frequent, continuing, and contested. So impressed was the trial judge
with DuPont's elaborate evidence that its findings closely simulated Du-
Pont's proposed findings.' 3
In an attack on the trial court decision which may have weakened
its own case the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court accepted
all the findings of fact but contended that from these facts the trial court
should have concluded that cellophane was a distinct market.'" The
6. Compare Bus. Wk., Je' 16, 1956, p. 34, stating that the Supreme Court had writ-
ten a new meaning for the concept of monopoly-a meaning that is likely to prevent the
government from demonstrating the existence of monopoly in many markets that would
otherwise be vulnerable to attack, as against the remark by Milton Handler in 11 Record
at 368 stating his belief that the Cellophuite case did not deal with questions of major
substantive importance.
7. 118 F. Supp. 41, 196 n. 1714 (D. Del. 1953).
8. CURRENT BusINEss STUDIES, March 1954 at 14.
9. Ibid.
10. Brief for Government, pp. 6-9, United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), affirming 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953) (hereinafter cited
as Brief for Government).
11. 118 F. Supp. 41, 197-198.
12. Id. at 200.
13. Op. cit. supra note 10.
14. See Dirlam & Stelzer, The Cellophane Labyrinth, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 633
(1956) for a criticism of the government's attack in the trial court. They contend that
the position of the government was one of extremes and was an overt attempt to extend
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government urged that the lower court decision contained erroneous
evaluations of the significant facts before it. It pointed out that even
DuPont's own reports indicated a realization of the non-competitiveness
of the other materials.15 The government further emphasized that cello-
phane's comparative prices with the other materials combined with Du-
Pont's high prices and great increase in business showed cellophane's
non-competitiveness with other materials.16 After pointing out these
internal inconsistencies in the lower court decision, the government said
that if the relevant facts were construed properly cellophane would be
considered a separate market. DuPont, on the other hand, stated that
although technically cellophane was a "part" of commerce, it did not
have monopoly power because of the character of the market in which it
sold its goods.' DuPont's argument relied heavily on the findings of
the trial court, which they pointed out the government did not contest.
DuPont further argued that the conclusions of the lower court were sup-
ported sufficiently by the evidence before it, and, therefore, they should
not be subject to attack.'
Both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court
agreed that the determination of market was crucial, the majority con-
ceding that if cellophane was the market then DuPont had a monopoly."
The majority, nevertheless, did not agree that DuPont would have been
a monopolizer even if they had a monopoly.2" The majority went on to
find that although cellophane was somewhat unique in certain qualities
and not similarly priced, the market in which cellophane competed was
such that there was a great interchangeability with the other materials.2'
Also they felt that a showing of high profits on the part of DuPont was
not conclusive without a showing of relative profits of other manufac-
turers.22 The majority proceeded to affirm the trial court in substan-
tially all of its conclusions on the facts presented. The minority, how-
ever, arrived at a different interpretation of the facts and chided the
majority for rejecting the concept of inter-industry competition, such as
between brick and other commodities like steel, wood, or stone, and then
the issue of "bigness per se." For an excellent criticism attacking the trial court
judgment in the Cellophane case see Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the
New Competition, 45 AM. EcoN. REv. 29 (1955).
15. Brief for Government at 76.
16. 24 U.S. L. Week 3101 (argument before the Supreme Court).
17. Id. at 3102-3103.
18. Ibid.
19. 351 U.S. 377, 391.
20. This provoked Justice Frankfurter to write a concurring opinion disassociating
himself from this part of the majority opinion which he thought was surplusage. 351
U.S. 377, 413.
21. 351 U.S. 377, 398-399.
22. Id. at 404.
accepting the competition between cellophane and the other materials.22
They based their conclusion that cellophane was its own market on the
increased volume of business of cellophane and the comparative indif-
ference of the price of the other materials to cellophane's price drops.24
This combined with the price difference and evidence from DuPont's
own reports influenced the dissenters to agree with the government that
a different conclusion should be drawn from the trial court findings of
fact.25
In comparing the majority and minority opinions it is difficult to
determine on what point of market definition they disagreed. Both
opinions agreed that interchangeability, physical characteristics, and rela-
tive prices of the goods were factors to be used in determining market.26
Both also paid lip service to the technical term "cross-elasticity of de-
mand" as a means of measuring the competitiveness of the materials.
About the only distinction that can be made is in terminology. The ma-
jority favored such phrases as "market alternatives that buyers may
readily use"2 and "functionally interchangeable"29 while the minority
preferred a "self same"3 product test to typify what products they con-
sidered were in competition. This seems to be merely a quibbling over
terms, while in reality the actual difference between the two opinions
seems to be merely conflicting evaluation of the findings of fact made by
the lower court.
Subsequent to both the district court and the Supreme Court deci-
sions there has been some controversy as to their validity.3' The argu-
ments both pro and con base themselves on either past cases or independ-
ent economic judgments as to DuPont's actual power. Unfortunately,
there seems to be no clear precedent for the Cellophane case, for although
there had been many cases dealing with market determination, only one,
the Alcoa case, " presented a similar fact situation and the same type of
Sherman Act violation.
In the Alcoa case the government appealed adverse findings by the
district court on the issue of whether Alcoa had "monopolized" virgin
23. Id. at 423.
24. Id. at 417.
25. Id. at 418.
26. Compare Id. at 394-398 with Id. at 414-418.
27. Id. at 417. But cf. MAcHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY, 522-523
(1852).
28. Id. at 394
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 414.
31. See note 5 and 14 supra. See also 11 RECORD 367 (1956).
32. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) re-
versing, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. N.Y.) (1941).
NOTES 377
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aluminum. Alcoa, in its defense, claimed that competition of imported
virgin aluminum and secondary native aluminum so limited its power to
control the price of virgin aluminum that it did not have monopoly
power." Judge Hand, in his opinion, conceded that imported and second-
ary aluminum actually did compete in the virgin aluminum market but
eliminated secondary aluminum in his computation of the market per-
centage. 4 This, however, was not because he thought that secondary
aluminum was outside the relevant market but because he thought that
Alcoa's control over the source of all aluminum would give it control of
scrap or secondary aluminum if Alcoa ever decided to limit its produc-
tion."3 Thus, this delimitation of market was not a narrow definition,
but is rather a refinement in computing market percentage control pecu-
liar to a relationship involving a raw material and its scrap. Later, on
remand to the district court for a remedy, Judge Knox deduced that con-
ditions had so changed that no longer could Alcoa control the scrap, and
he therefore included secondary aluminum in the computation of market
control.3" Another facet of the Alcoa case which might be cited as prece-
dent for narrowly defining a market in monopolization cases is the man-
ner in which Judge Hand summarily dismissed the competition of the
other light metals, such as copper, from his market definition.3" This
market definition is necessarily narrow, however, because the sales out-
lets of virgin aluminum were the aluminum fabricators, who could not
change readily to other metals because of insurmountable metallergical
difficulties. From a practical sales standpoint, moreover, it would be
quite awkward for a consumer of virgin aluminum, such as Reynolds
aluminum, to change over to copper ware. 8 Judge Hand did consider
the effect of these other metals in the aluminum end product market.
He specifically rejected an alleged monopoly in aluminum cable because
of the direct competition of copper cable.39 Similarly, he included sub-
stitute metal products in the same market as aluminum utensils."' Under
close analysis of the Alcoa and Cellophane cases, the contention by the
33. Id. at 423.
34. Id. at 424-425.
35. Ibid.
36. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 81 F. Supp. 333, 357-358 (S.D.
N.Y.) (1950).
37. 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945) stating that Alcoa was free from domestic
competition, "save as it drew other metals into the market as substitutes."
38. Attacks on the Alcoa case such as that put forward in 1950, U. ILL. L. FORUM
515, 525-528 and that stated by R. S. Meriam in Anti-Trust Law Symposium, N.Y. Bar
Ass. C.C.H. (1950 ed.) seem to lose sight of this point. It seems useless to talk of com-
petition by other materials in end products when the market dealt with was the alumi-
num fabricators who were the consumers of virgin aluminum.
39. 148 F.2d 416, 438 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. Id. at 436.
NOTES
majority in the Cellophane case that the two cases presented different
problems seems to be substantiated.4 Where the cases are similar, as in
respect to the end products of aluminum cable and utensils, the Alcoa
case seems to compliment the contention by the majority in the Cellophane
case that substitute products may be considered in a market although of
a different substance and not priced the same. Therefore, viewed in
light of Judge Hand's reasoning in the Alcoa case the decision in the
Cellophane case is not a departure from prior law.42
The next problem, that of determining the amount of actual compe-
tition given cellophane by the other materials, is much more difficult. On
this point, as previously stated, the majority was content to rely on the
trial court's conclusions concerning the supposed buying habits of the
purchasers of flexible wrapping papers, while the minority preferred to
base its decision on the difference in physical characteristics, which,
combined with the difference in price of the materials, was enough to
indicate to their minds a monopoly. Although there are conflicting
opinions concerning the validity of both the Supreme Court and district
court opinions it seems that from the facts disclosed in the proceedings
there was actual competition between cellophane and the other materials.43
Cellophane sales had been directly affected by changes in price and im-
provements in quality of the other materials. Indeed, the trial court
foresaw that the film, pliofilm, although not competitive in a real sense at
the time of adjudication, was destined to enter the competition in a real
sense in the near future.4
Another crucial question, however, of whether this competition was
artificial or real was never properly before the Court, although it was
latent in the government argument and reflected in the dissenting
opinion.4" Stated in hypothetical form, this problem is whether a pro-
ducer of a somewhat unique article is a monopolist if he has the choice
of pricing his goods so high that other goods will compete, while at nor-
mal levels of profits and prices the other goods would not compete.4" The
answer, of course, is that such a producer does have monopoly power,
for the assumption that the producer may allow other goods to compete
41. 351 U.S. 377, n. 23 at 396 (1956).
42. But see Turner, Anti Trust Policy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 281, 292, 308.
43. See notes 5 and 14 supra.
44. 351 U.S. 377, 399-400.
45. In all fairness to the government's attack it should be noted that the proper
presentation of this type of issue would have increased the government's already burden-
some task in the Cellophane case. The only feasible way to include this attack would
have been to attack DuPont first on the theory that cellophane had its own distinct mar-
ket and did not compete and then in the alternative prove that even if cellophane did
compete it had such a cost advantage as to give it monopoly power.
46. CURRENT Bus. STUDIEs, March 1954 p. 18.
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or not also assumes monopoly power. Even the majority opinion makes
reference to the possibility of this situation by refuting the government's
argument concerning DuPont's profits, stating that such evidence with-
out comparable data of the other wrapping paper producers' profits would
be inadequate to show monopoly power." What the majority would
have done if shown that the other manufacturers' profits were conspicu-
ously lower than DuPont's raises a relevant question concerning these
profits. Without proof, however, the majority concluded that this great
profit was either due to the increase in commodity packaging in recent
years or to DuPont's efficiency.48 The minority, however, were not
content with this explanation and seemed to be conscious of a price-cost
advantage in favor of DuPont when they emphasized the lack of sensitiv-
ity of the other materials' prices to cellophane's price changes.45 This
economic non-competitireness was again pointed out by the minority by
showing that in 1948 although cellophane increased its prices seven per-
cent, still its earnings were increased.5" This, the minority pointed out,
invalidates the contention of the lower court that if DuPont were to
increase its prices in monopolistic fashion the self-adjusting market
would punish DuPont by decreasing its sales to the extent that its profits
would dwindle.51 In this manner, the minority stressed the economic fact
that it is possible for a producer of goods subject to competition from
substitutes to have high prices relative to costs and a smaller share of
the market or low prices relative to costs and a larger share of the mar-
ket, and in both cases to have high profits." Unfortunately, this argu-
ment, without a showing of the market conditions at the time and the
economic condition of the competitors, is similar to questioning how high
is high. Due to the fact that the government's argument was addressed
to proving that cellophane had its own distinct market rather than prov7
ing that although cellophane competed with the other materials it had
such a cost-price advantage as to give it monopoly power, the data of
the other producers were not put in evidence.
An excellent exposition of the cost-price problem has been stated in
the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee by Carl Kaysen
when he said, "[w]here we look at competition among substitutes, we
47. 351 U.S. 377, 404.
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 417-418.
50. Id. at 422-423.
51. Ibid.
52. See note 46 supra.
53. Comparable data of the profits of the producers of the other materials would
be pertinent but due to the many factors to be dealt with in ascertaining the general ef-
ficiency of the other producers as compared with DuPont, not conclusive.
NOTES
cannot define the market intelligently without looking at price-cost mar-
gins, and the costs of the various substitute products as well as their
prices. Only where two products are close substitutes at prices in the close
neighborhood of their respective cost, can we include them in the same
market."54 This idea is not without case precedent for it was espoused
as early as the Corn Products case in 1916." In this case Judge Hand
decided that as long as the cost of production per unit of a desired quan-
tity favored one producer of goods over another, although the favored
producer had a limited monopoly within these limits he had a true
monopoly." This theory was later reiterated by Judge Hand in the Alcoa
case, when he stated that although the influence of potential imported
virgin aluminum was a limit on the price Alcoa could put on virgin alu-
minum, this ceiling on price policy did not nullify Alcoa's monopoly
power." The underlying rationale of the cost-price relationship also
seems to permeate the cases delimiting the market into areas, because of
shipping costs which would have to be assumed by the producer and
would add to the cost of placing a product in competition.5
Unfortunately, the elimination of substitute products by the cost-
price relationship raises many problems. Determining a cost-price index
of either the commodity alleged to be monopolized or its substitute would
entail a weighing of the efficiency and possible hidden advantages of each
of the producers. This added burden of determining the validity of
complicated economic evidence would possibly cloud the courts' vision
instead of clearing it." Proof of consistently high profits could present
a prima facie case of monopoly power, but this could show merely ef-
54. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 196.
55. United States v. Corn Products Refining Co. 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y.) (1916).
56. Id. at 975, 976.
57. 148 F.2d 416, 426.
58. In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)
at 291-292 the court in defining the market stated that although the defendants were
limited by the price of cast iron plus the additional freight charges from outside the
area, that within these bounds they held monopoly power. Considering the freight charge
as a cost of distribution the court could have just as easily had said that the defendant
had such a cost-price advantage over those outside the area as to give him monopoly
power. The case was similar in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519
(1948) where the Court limited its discussion of rolled and fabricated steel to a seven
state area rather than the whole United States. What else would preclude the other
producers from other states from competing in this market except for the freight costs
which would put them at a compettiive disadvantage? Like considerations were relevant
in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 n. 5, at 299 (1949)
where the Court stated that the area to be judged is that which is in effective competi-
tion.
59. As to the difficulties of the present procedure on market analysis and similar
problems see Justice Jackson's statement in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 372 (1949) where he considers the judicial process inadequate for
such economic issues.
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ficient business tactics."0 These problems, although theoretically diffi-
cult to solve, are not insurmountable in the practical cases which would
involve this refinement of the market definition test. Mitigating fac-
tors would almost always arise to ease the difficulty of the test. Such
factors as a captive buyer, for example the cigarette industry in the Cel-
lophane case, would tend to stabilize profits of the defendant producer at
higher levels than its competitors and increase the probability that the
producer held monopoly power.61 This type of attack, as has been noted,
may find the trial courts ill equipped to pass accurately on such evidence,
but this type of evidence does not seem to be more difficult than that
already before the courts on market definition. 2 This cost-price method
of delimiting the market, although not squarely adopted by the Supreme
Court, would probably have been accepted by the Court in the Cellophane
case if it had been presented in suitable fashion.
The method used by the majority in distinguishing a number of
cases presented by the government to support their contention that mar-
ket definition in past cases had limited markets to narrow field presents
another problem. The Court distinguished such cases as the Indiana
Farmers Guide Publishing case,63 the Columbia Steel case,64 and the Para-
60. CURRENT BUSINESS STUDIES, March 1954 at 22.
61. 351 U.S. 377, 399, 406. In this field Cellophane controlled some 75% to 80%,
and therefore the cigarette industry could be considered virtually a captive buyer. The
reason why this alone was not enough to give DuPont power to control its price was
because this part of production consisted of but 11.6% of its total production, and thus
DuPont would be forced to price competively with the other materials.
62. There seems to be a great deal of consternation about the ill informed manner
in which economic evidence has been handled before the courts. This may be caused
either by lack of acceptable proof in 'he ordinary role of evidence or by the general
incompetence of the trial court judges. One trial court judge has summarized the
problem by stating that Congress, through the anti-trust laws, had placed upon the courts
complex economic controversies such as "market" which have no easy definition and
have left the courts without acceptable procedures or standards to point up the issues,
thus leading to tedious and often confused trials. CURRENT BUSINESS STUDIES, March
1954 at 16. A glaring example of this ineptitude of the courts was experienced in the
Alcoa trial court. The government attempted to submit statistics comprising two pages
of data on imported aluminum but thettrial court judge required first that the govern-
ment submit evidence of every statute under which the government compiled these sta-
tistics since 1890. It also required the original books year by year which contained the
relevant figures. These proceedings took approximately one week to verify the two
page report. 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 164, 173 (1940 Supplement). These reasons combined
with the fact that trial court judges do not have qualified advisers have brought to mind
the suggestion that these cases be judged on an administrative board level. CURRENT
BUSINESS STUDIES, Oct. 1954 at 71; 1 ANTI-TRUST BULL. (May-July 1956). A sug-
gested general solution would be to urge the law schools to train the future judges to
deal with these problems. Another present remedy would be to make available qualified
advisers as exemplified by the use of Carl Kaysen, an economist, as a law clerk in the
Shoe Machinery Case. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Mass. 1953) ; 60 YALE L. J. 1076, 1082
(1951).
63. Indiana Farmer's Guide Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268
(1934).
64. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
NOTES
mount case,6" among others, by blandly stating that these cases were de-
cided on the issue of attempted monopoly or an unreasonable restraint of
trade and thus went on to dismiss these cases as authority.66 From this
part of the opinion an inference may be drawn that the Court recognizes
two or more definitions of market corresponding to the different viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. This interpretation of the court's decision
can be justified on the basis of the difference of conduct inherent in the
various offenses. Thus such activities as that of a local newspaper re-
fusing to advertise for merchants who advertised on a local radio station
are much more obvious than the conduct in the Alcoa case-the outward
extent of which was the buying up of possible water power sites.6" This
dichotomy would lead logically to a broad definition of market for ac-
tions brought under monopolization offenses under the Sherman Act
where overt conduct is sparse, as against a narrow definition for con-
spiracy or attempt to create a monopoly, where the conduct and design of
the defendant leave him no room to complain of the stringent definition.
Since this interpretation of market definition depends on the difference
in degree of the conduct involved, it would seem to be much more logical
to have a uniform market definition and a different market percentage
test for the various offenses, which in fact seems to be the tenor of the
decisions prior to the Cellophane case.6"
Assuming arguendo that there are different definitions for the var-
ious offenses, there seems to be nothing in the Cellophane case which
either expands or contracts the market definition of the Alcoa case. In-
deed, if there is a distinction between the market definitions of the vari-
65. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
66. 351 U.S. 377, n. 23 at 395, 396.
67. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) ; United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
68. For example it is hard to determine the difference in criteria used in differen-
tiating between automatic and manual concrete block making machines, United States v.
Beaser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951); farm newspapers and regular
newspapers, Indiana Farmers Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S.
268 (1934); various submarkets in shoe machinery, United States v. U.S. Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Mass. 1953) (dictum); refined "grits" and
brewer's "grits," United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y.
1916) ; regular priced and ten cent cigarettes, American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; "first run" and "second run" movies, United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; an established wholesale house and a potential new one,
Gamco Inc. v. Providence Fruit and Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952) ; news-
papers and other mass dissemination of news, Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953) ; But see Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) ;
linen rungs, and other rugs, United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms Inc., 63 F. Supp.
32 (D.C. Minn. 1945) ; color film and black and white film, Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC,
158 F.2d 592 (2nd Cir. 1946) ; green slate and black slate, O'Halloran v. American Sea
Gieen Slate Co., 207 Fed. 187 (N.D. N.Y. 1913) ; hydraulic and other pumps, Kobe Inc.
v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
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ous offenses, it must be a fine line, for the factors which were used in
determining that "rolled" steel and fabricated steel were in the same
market in the Columbia Steel case"9 and similar considerations which
placed a morning newspaper in the same market with an evening news-
paper in the Times-Picayune case look distractingly similar to the fac-
tors used by the Court in the Cellophane case. In the former case the
Court refused to consider fabricated (plate and shape) steel on a market
distinct from the rolled steel market, due to the fact that a producer of
rolled steel could easily produce other steel products and were "inter-
changeable" with these other products.71 In the latter case the Court re-
fused to delimit "morning" from "evening" newspapers because the mar-
ket was the advertising readership and this included both morning and
evening newspapers.72 Furthermore, there seems to be no valid reason
why a cost-price analysis should be excluded from the broadest defini-
tion of market, since the idea is reflected in both the Cellophane and
Alcoa cases." Thus, since the broadest explanation of this supposed
dichotomy of market definitions includes all the pertinent economic fac-
tors for accurately determining monopoly power, the proposed different
definitions of market seem to vanish.
We are therefore left with a definition of market which is neces-
sarily broad and which encompasses a refinement of cost-price relation-
ship in applicable situations which defy standardization. The crucial
question in seeking a market definition reverts to determining the sphere
of rivalry in which a buyer may transfer readily from one supplier of a
product to another, assuming of course a true competition." The ap-
plication of this test by the trial courts may sometimes lead to doubtful
economic judgments, because of either the trial judge's personal in-
adequacies to rule on such complicated and usually elaborate evidence or
possibly to the strictness of judicial rules of evidence. 5 Thus, the Cel-
lophane case may support any of three possible conclusions. It might
possibly be considered as showing how certain inadequacies of trial courts
in construing complicated economic evidence may even get past the Su-
preme Court; but, yet, it might just point out that the government was
not diligent in presenting their whole case so that the Supreme Court
could adjudicate on all the issues. Finally, the decision may be com-
pletely supportable if a really competitive market without a cost-price
69. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
70. Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
71. 334 U.S. 495.
72. 345 U.S. 594.
73. See notes 47-51 and note 57 supra.
74. REPORT at 322.
75. See note 62 supra.
NOTES
advantage existed at the time of adjudication, although it was not shown.
What may be said with certainty about the Cellophane case, however, is
that there was no diversion from the Alcoa case, and if there were any
changes from other prior cases on the question of market definition it
was in form and not in substance.
REGULATORY "EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE" TO WITHHOLD
INFORMATION
That the maintenance of secrecy in regard to certain types of infor-
mation in the possession of the federal government is desirable needs no
explanation. The executive branch having been entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of carrying on the affairs of the nation, it is natural that the
appropriate departments, in their discretion, classify information collected
by them in the exercise of these functions. On the other hand, it is a
fundamental requirement in the Anglo-American system of administra-
tion of justice that any evidence which may aid in the assessment of the
rights of the parties to a law suit be made available,' if need be under
judicial compulsion. Obviously, where the two requirements conflict,
i.e. when data possessed by the executive branch and considered by it
not susceptible of disclosure becomes needed as evidence in court pro-
ceedings, a decision must be reached which subordinates one of the two
requirements to the other. This adjustment is made within the frame-
work of the law of evidentiary privileges from disclosure. When the
need for secrecy is determined to be paramount, the court will accord
immunity from disclosure to the information in the form of a "govern-
mental privilege."2
1. Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915).
2. The two common law governmental privileges universally recognized are the
state secrets privilege and the informer privilege. The former is said to apply where it
is attempted to obtain production of information the disclosure of which would tend to
injure the national security or cause diplomatic embarrassment. The latter is applicable
to prevent disclosure of the identity of informers who are the government's sources of
information concerning illegal acts committed. The policy behind this privilege is
founded on a fear that communications of this type will in the future be made less
freely, or not at all, if the precedent of disclosing the communicant's identity in court
proceedings were to be established, such communications being essential to the efficient
administration of government.
One distinction, besides that inherent in the policy reasons, between the two privi-
leges is found in the fact that in the case of the informer privilege the privilege is one
which attaches to a type of information, the privilege being granted (unless special rea-
sons exist for not granting it) as soon as it is established that the information sought
to be produced is of that type, i.e. is the identity of an informer, whereas a state secrets
privilege is founded on characteristics inherent in the particular data sought to be pro-
